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Richard Eldridge
Romantic Subjectivity in Goethe and Wittgenstein
Abstract: From roughly 1600 to 1800, a new form of subjectivity developed in Europe. As a 
result of developments in science, technology and political economy, subjects — first a small 
minority an then an increasingly large sector of the bourgeoise — began to sense new possi­
bilities of leading independent lives, with shapes determined fi'om their own inner resources. 
As subjects began to accord greater and greater importance to their individual thoughts, feel­
ings, Md sensibilities, courses of life came to be seen as properly determined less and less by 
heredity and class membership and more and more by fi-ee personality. At the same time, 
however, the experience of the possibility and value of a ^Fe of fre^ persoflality was fi^ighted 
with anxieties and uncertainties about how really to get on with life and about what one’s so­
cial reception and place might be.
Goethe’s The Sufferings Of Young Werther models the shape of life of such a 
new subject. Werther demonstrates a peculiarly Intense sensory receptivity, a 
mobility of thought, and thoroughgoing uncertainty about his social and personal 
identity. These features of his character are evident in the short observations on 
and summaries of his daily life that he sends to his friend Wilhelm — a kind of 
absent second self and in the peculiarly intense language that Goethe puts in 
Werther’s pen and consciousness. In the end, a less subjectively intense com­
mon social life goes on without Werther, who proves unable to find a place 
within it.
The protagonist in Wittgensteins’s Philosophical Investigations demonstrates a 
similarly strong and unsettled subjectivity in his conversations with himself 
about philosophical problems. His thoughts too are labile: he doesn’t ‘know his 
way about’, and he does not know either how to bring his reflections to a con­
structive end or how to integrate himself into any community. In contrast, how­
ever, to the end of Werther, the protagonist finds in the inexhaustibility of his 
reflections a kind of home in writerly activity, albeit without social peace.
By developing the comparison between subjectivities of the protagonist of Wer­
ther and Philosophical Investigations, I argue that modem, romantic subjectiv­
ity, which is nearly inescapable for us, involves having a sense of the continuing 
task or burden of integrating intense subjectivity with stable social life. In this 
we live between the two forms of escapism into deathwithdrawal or into iso­
lated, modernist, artistic activity that characterize the ends of Werther and of the
128 Richard Eldridge
protagonist of Philosophical Investigations. Writing is one central way to carra 
on this life, literally and metaphorically.
As a result of the fine work of Mark Rowe, Joachim Schulte, Gordon Baker and 
Peter Hacker,' it has now been evident for some time that there are deep affini­
ties — affinities in style and textual organization, in conceptions of elucidatory 
explanation via comparisons, and in a sense of subjectivity housed within nature 
— between the Goethe of the Farbenlehre and the Wittgenstein of Philosophi­
cal Investigations. Among the very deepest of these affinities is their shared 
sense of the limits of metaphysical explanation. The identification of simple ele­
ments is always relative to purposes and circumstances, never ultimate. Hence 
there is no single kind of ultimate explanation running fi-om the nature and be­
havior of ultimate simples to the nature and behavior of complexes composed 
out of them. There are often useful explanations to be found of how the behav­
iors of complexes are determined by the behaviors of their parts, but this kind of 
explanation is one among many. Comparative descriptions of complexes — 
whether of organisms, human practices, works of art, or chemical and physical 
structures — are not to be supplanted in favor of ultimate metaphysical explana­
tion.
Valuable and sound though these ideas are, they are, however, not my theme in 
this essay. Instead, I am concerned with a different form of affinity between 
Goethe and Wittgenstein, an affinity in their senses of what it is to be a human 
subject. To be sure, I will practice some comparative description of their re­
spective senses of subjectivity in the hope that some illumination may result, but 
I will dwell more on the substance of the comparisons than on the logic or meth­
odology of the illumination pursued.
Thomas Mann’s remarks on Die Leiden des jungen Werthers provide a useful 
starting point. “It would”, Mann observes,
not be a simple task to analyze the psychic state that determined the underpinning 
of European civilization at that time [1774, the date of publication of Werther].
[...] A discontent with civilization, an emancipation of emotions, a gnawing 
yearning for a return to the natural and elemental, a shaking at the shackles of os­
sified culture, a revolt against convention and bourgeois confinement: everything 
converged to create a spirit that came up against the limitations of individuation
' See M. W. Rowe, “Goethe and Wittgenstein”, in: Philosophy 66 (1991); J. Schulte, 
“Chor und Gesetz: Zur ‘Morphologischen Methode’ bei Goethe and Wittgenstein”, in: 
Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1984); G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgen­
stein: Understanding and Meaning, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, 537-540. I summa­
rize and comment on this work in my “Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein”, Intention- 
ality and Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997,177-181.
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itself, that allowed an effijsive, boimdless affirmation of life to take on the form of 
a death wish. Melancholy and discontent with the rhythmical monotony of life 
was the norm.^
It is likewise not a simple task to say what may have made such melancholy and 
discontent the norm, at least in certain circles. Secularization, bringing with it a 
sense of lost meaningfiilness as religious ritual became a smaller part of daily 
life, and modernization, bringing with it a market economy and new but very un­
certain life chances, are surely part of the story. But secularization and moderni­
zation are themselves interwoven with deep, largely tacit selfunderstandings 
about what is worth doing, in ways that are difficult to disentangle. Charles 
Taylor, in his monumental survey of the making of the modem identity, de­
scribes what he calls
three major facets of this identity: first, modem inwardness, the sense of ourselves 
as beings with inner depths; second, the affirmation of ordinary life which devel­
ops from the early modem period; third, the expressivist notion of nature as an 
inner moral source.’
These facets of identity that come to the fore in modernity are as much a part of 
a generally possible human repertoire of identity as they are byproducts of 
something else. They are, according to Taylor, an Inescapable part of our moral 
framework, a set of commitments that we cannot help but have.
One important result of these commitments, is an undecomposable intermingling 
of moral discovery with moral invention. We no longer think of ourselves as 
simply living out in one way or another basic human tendencies that are simply 
given. Rather, drawing on our inwardness, on ordinary life, and on nature, we 
partly make ourselves what we are. As Taylor puts it,
We find the sense of life through articulating it. And modems have 
acutely aware of how much sense being there for us depends on our own 
of expression. Discovering here depends on, is interwoven with, inventing.
Finding is inseparable from founding.
But why should this occasion what Mann noted: discontent, yearning, shaking, 
revolt, melancholy, and a death wish? It is easy enough to see why a certain im- 
provisatoriness and independence of mind might be valued. But how and why 
did our moral improvisations come to be freighted with all that? — Here the
’ Th. Mann, “On Goethe’s Werther”, in: V. Lange, ed., tr. E. Corra, The Sufferings of 
Young Werther and Elective Affinities, New York: Continuum, 1990, 2.
’ Ch. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem Identity, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989.
" Ibid., 18.
become
^wers
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answer has to do, I think, with a certain lack of both ground and closure to our 
moral efforts. Without fixed tendencies and tele as starting points and endpoints, 
it becomes uncertain what moral progress and human achievement might look 
like, even uncertain whether they are possible at all. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Jean-Luc Nancy note the uncertainties that attach to our moral efforts in the 
wake of the felt absence of any fixed presentation of the self and its powers, as 
they describe the conception of the subject in Kant’s moral theory.
Without oversimplifying or hardening the contours of a question that merits ex­
tended analysis, we cannot fail to note that this ‘subject’ of morality can be de­
fined only negatively, as a subject that is not the subject of knowledge (this 
knowledge suppressed ‘to make room for belief), as a subject without mathesis, 
even of itself It is indeed posited as freedom, and freedom is the locus of ‘self- 
consciousness’. But this does not imply that there is any cognition — or even 
consciousness — of freedom. [...] (T)he question of [the moral subject’s] unity, 
and thus of its very “being subject”, is brought to a pitch of high tension.’
Lacking a fixed ground and definite telos, efforts at articulating and enacting ‘a 
sense of life’ come to be marked by a desperate intensity. Different subjects be­
come variously lost within different ongoing projects of articulation, each main­
taining its sense of its place and progress not through ratification by an audience, 
which is all too caught up in its own projects, but rather through an hysterical 
lingering in process. Articulation
sets out to penetrate the essence of poiesy [— poetic making —], in which the 
[articulation] produces the truth of production itself, [...] the truth of production 
of itself, of autopoiesy.’
The manifold modem Bildungsromane and personal epics of coming to selfcon­
sciousness and assured social vocation, but Bildungsromane and epics that have 
difficulty in reaching their own conclusions (other, perhaps, than by taking the 
artistic making of the very work in hand as the achieved telos), are evidence of 
the dominance of the project of autopoiesis in the modem moral imagination. 
Human moral selfimagination and achievement become a “question of the be­
coming present of the highest’’^, not of its being present.
’ Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe and J.-L. Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature 
in German Romanticism, tr. Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester, Albany; State University 
of New York Press, 1988, 31.
’ Ibid., 12. The subject term of Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Nancy’s clauses is “literary produc­
tion”, not “articulation”, but with the migration of human self-production toward the lit­
erary, in a mbc of discovery and invention, the latter, more genera! term makes their char­
acterizations appropriate to human moral efforts in general.
’ R. Gasche, “Foreword” to Friedrich Schlegel, Philosophical Fragments, tr. P. Firchow, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, Xix.
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The three inescapable parts of our moral framework that Taylor identifies — in­
wardness, ordinary life, and nature as an expressive resource — conspire in our 
experience with and against one another to inhibit the achievement of a stable 
sense of life. Either nature in the aspect of the sublime conspires with inward­
ness to resist the sways of ordinary life and conventionality, thus setting up the 
image of the chthonic genius as the exemplar of moral achievement, as in 
Nietzsche, or nature in the aspect of the beautiful conspires with ordinary life 
and conventionality, thus setting up an image of pastoralized domesticity as the 
exemplar of moral achievement, as in certain moments in Rousseau. Each image 
then stands in Immediate criticism of the other, and no stable image of moral 
achievement persists.
Under such uncertainties and instabilities, it is all too plausible that one might 
not only become melancholic, but come to wish for nothing more than surcease, 
even to regard the taking of one’s own life as the only possible creative act with 
a fixed endpoint, as the only meaningful act. Or of course, more modestly, one 
might forego efforts to live according to a sense of life or to what is highest and 
assume instead an instrumentalist stance toward the things of life, seeking only 
modest satisfactions. This strategy is common in modernity, and it is surely hon­
orable. But does it quite escape the silent melancholies, quiet desperations, and 
covert nihilisms about which Emerson and Thoreau and Nietzsche variously 
warned us?
To come now specifically to Werther: Werther’s own character is tom between 
the idealized images of chthonic originality, represented for him by the wild ex­
cesses of his own iimer emotional life, and pastoralized domesticity, represented 
for him by the figure of Lotte, maternally feeding bread to her younger brothers 
and sisters. There are interesting historical specificities that surround the split in 
Werther’s character — and in Goethe’s between these two ideals. In his monu­
mental study of Goethe’s development, Nicholas Boyle suggests that these ide­
als are posed, and posed as irresolvable, for Werther and for Goethe, by certain 
strains in 18th century German culture. “Werther’s innermost life”, he writes,
is determined by a public mood; he lives out to the last, and inflicts on those 
around him, the loyalties which — because they are literary, in-tellectual, in a 
sense imaginary loyalties, generated within the current media of communication 
— most of his contemporaries take only halfserlously. His obsessions are not 
gratuitously idiosyncratic — they belong to his real and socially determined char­
acter, not just to a pathologically selfebsorbed consciousness.*
* N. Boyle, Goethe: The Poet and the Age — Volume 1: The Poetry of Desire, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991, 176.
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Specifically, Boyle suggests that Leibnizianism, Pietism, and Sentimentalism 
offered images to Goethe of “the self thirsting for its perfectly adequate object.”* 
This thirsting of the self for a confirming object took an especially inwardized 
turn in Germany, since it could not plausibly be welded to a project of political 
nation building. Autonomy or achieved selfhood had to be found within, and its 
principal marks were inner intensities of imagination, feeling, and devotion. 
Goethe’s subjectivity, like Werther’s, is dominated by “his belief in binding 
moments of insighf’'® to be achieved fitfully against the sway of official and 
conventional culture. At the same time, however, Goethe also absorbed a certain 
political realism and social consciousness from the Storm-and-Stress movement. 
He had an awareness of individual character types, including his own, as specific 
social roles — a novelist’s sense (unlike anything in Werther himself) of social 
reality as narratable from multiple points of view. In Werther, as Boyle charac­
terizes it,
the Sentimentalist content of the novel is in perfect but momentary balance with a 
Storm and Stress aesthetic which determines the manner of its presentation."
Like Werther, Goethe in writing Werther
endeavored to find roles for himself to act out which both had some general moral 
or historical significance and could be filled by him with a sense of selfhood: roles 
which fused both a [social] character and [an intensely individual] conscious­
ness."
Inwardness and the pursuit of chthonic originality alone lead to empty solipsism; 
acceptance of oneself as a social type and conformity to convention alone lead 
to derivativeness and imaginative death. The task is to combine the pursuit of 
originality with acceptance of oneself as a social type. Unlike Werther, Goethe 
himself carried out this task through the act of writing about his innermost emo­
tions and selfimaginations in a social setting. This act of writing gave him the 
opportunity both to cultivate his inner life and to achieve a certain realistic dis­
tance from it. For Werther himself, faced with the same task and tom between 
his hyperbolic idealizations of originality on the one hand and domesticity on the 
other, things do not go so well. The “very impetus to selfdestruction is being im­
posed on him by the German public mind” — itself faced with the problem of 
cultivating both autonomous selfhood and continuing sociality — “commerce 
with which he cannot avoid, or wish to avoid, if he is to express himself at all.”’^ 
The task of blending selfhood with social identity is neither unique to Werther,
’ Ibid., 124.
Ibid., 110. 
" Ibid., 177. 
" Ibid., 162. 
Ibid., 176.13
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nor to Goethe, nor to the German public mind of the late eighteenth century. It is 
the fate of modem subjectivity as such either to face or to evade it.
Like Boyle, Mann too characterizes Werther as “the overrefined final product of 
the Christian Pietist cult of the soul and of the emotions.”'^ What this means, 
above all, is a desire for singularity, specifically a desire to desire, intensely and 
infinitely. As Mann puts it,
the desire to exchange that which is confining and conditional for that which is 
infinite and limitless is the fiindamental character of Werther’s nature, as it is of 
Faust’s. [...] He is in love even before his love has an object.”
Even Lotte asks Werther,
Why must you love me, me only, who belongs to another? I fear, I fear, that it is 
only the impossibility of possessing me that makes your desire for me so strong.”
Only a desire for the impossible can certify itself as genuinely singular and origi­
nal, capable of confirming selfhood against the grain of conventionality.
In the grip of such a desire, impossibly seeking original selfhood both against the 
grain of all conventionality and yet blended with social identity, no one knows 
what to do. Our desires are original if and only if impossible, unrecognizable; 
and they are recognizable and satisfiable if and only they are mimes of the con­
ventionalized desires of others. No wonder that Werther observes that
All learned teachers and tutors agree that children do not understand the cause of 
their desires; but no one likes to think that adults too wander about this earth like 
children, not knowing where they come from or where they are going, not acting 
in accord with genuine motives, but ruled like children by biscuits, sugarplums, 
and the rod — and yet it seems to me so obvious. (9)
Werther cannot anywhere recognize, act on, and satisfy his own desire as his 
own.
As he then himself wanders the earth, impossibly seeking fully original selfhood 
blended with social identity, Werther alternates in his moments of attachment 
and identification between surrender to beautiful scenes of sociality, composure, 
convention, and pastoralized domesticity, on the one hand, and ecstatic
” Th. Mann, op. cit., 9.
” Ibid., 9-10.
” J. W. V. Goethe, “The Sorrows of Young Werther”, in: D. E. Wellbery, ed., tr. V. Lang, 
Goethe: The Collected Works, vol. 11,, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 72. 
Subsequent references to Werther will all be to this edition and will be indicated in the 
text by page number.
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abandonment to sublime scenes of wild creative energy, on the other. In neither 
moment is the attachment or abandonment either ordinary or in fact achieved; in 
both cases it is hyperbolized in Werther’s imagination into something excep­
tional, and his hyperbolizing imagination blocks his actually doing anything.
The emblem in nature of the beautiful, of pastoralized domesticity, and attach­
ment, in Werther’s imaginative perception, is the cozy valley of Wahlheim — 
home’s choice.
‘It is’, Werther writes early on, interestingly situated on a hill, and by following 
one of the footpaths out of the village, you can have a view of the whole valley 
below you. A kindly woman keeps a small inn there, selling wine, beer, and cof­
fee; and she is extremely cheerful and pleasant in spite of her age. The chief charm 
of this spot consists in two linden trees, spreading their enormous branches over 
the little green before the church, which is entirely surrounded by peasants’ cot­
tages, bams, and homesteads. Seldom have I seen a place so intimate and com­
fortable [...] (10)
The force and direction of Werther’s idealization is evident in his litany of ad­
jectives: “kindly”, “small”, “cheerful”, “pleasant”, “little”, “intimate”, and 
“comfortable”. Here he would — originally and creatively — surrender himself 
to a domesticated, given, human life in nature. But to desire to do this originally 
and creatively is to make one unable to do it, and Werther simply gazes on the 
scene, until, as he thinks of himself, he reverts in thought to the idea of nature as 
also a source of iconoclastic creative energy.
The counterpart scene in which Werther imagines ecstatically abandoning him­
self to the sublime comes late in his correspondence, as things are not going 
well. On December 12th, he writes.
Sometimes I am oppressed, not by apprehension or fear, but by an inexpressible 
inner fury which seems to tear up my heart and choke me. It’s awful, awful. And 
then I wander about amid the horrors of the night, at this dreadful time of the 
year.
Yesterday evening it drove me outside. A rapid thaw had suddenly set in: I had 
been told that the river had risen, that the brooks had all overflowed their banks, 
and that the whole valley of Wahlheim was under water! I rushed out after eleven 
o’clock. A terrible sight. The furious torrents rolled from the mountains in the 
moonlight — fields, trees, and hedges tom up, and the entire valley one deep lake 
agitated by the roaring wind! And when the moon shone forth, and tinged the 
black clouds, and the wild torrent at my feet foamed and resounded in this grand 
and frightening light, I was overcome by feelings of terror, and at the same time 
yearning. With arms extended, I looked down into the yawning abyss, and cried, 
“Down! Down!” For a moment I was lost in the intense delight of ending my sor­
rows and my sufferings by a plunge into that gulf! But then I felt rooted to the 
earth and incapable of ending my woes! (69-70)
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If only he could give himself over to this energy in sublime nature, to this wild 
torrent, the problem of the satisfaction of impossible desire would at least be 
ended, if not solved. Werther’s itinerary lets itself be read as a move from 
sometime attachment to the beautiful to complete domination by the sublime, 
ending in the realization that only this end is possible. In some earlier scenes of 
the perception of nature, Werther’s awareness shifts abruptly and jarringly back 
and forth between a sense of the “overflowing fullness” of nature, before which 
he feels “as if a god myself’ and a sense of nature as “an allconsuming, devour­
ing monster.” (36-37). At this late moment in December, he remains in the con­
dition that he had earlier ascribed to humanity in general: “we are as poor and 
limited as ever, and our soul still languishes for unattainable happiness”. (20) 
His death looms, but he does yet quite grasp it: “My hour is not yet come: I feel 
it”. (70)
Werther’s relations to Lotte directly mirror his relations to nature. Both are 
dominated by his hyperbolizing imagination, as he sees her now as beautiful, 
now as sublime. When he first sees her, he finds
Six children, from eleven to two years old [...] running about the room, sur­
rounding a lovely girl of medium height, dressed in a simple white frock with pink 
ribbons. She was holding a loaf of dark bread in her hands, and was cutting slices 
for the little ones all round, in proportion to their age and appetite. She performed 
her task with such affection, and each child awaited his turn with outstretched 
hands and artlessly shouted his thanks. (15)
Everything here is simple, cozy, natural, and artless, in forming a scene of mild­
ness with which Werther would like to identify. But then he also dreams that
I pressed her to me and covered with countless kisses those dear lips of hers 
which murmured words of love in response. Our eyes were one in the bliss of ec­
stasy. (70)
In each case, Lotte is more a posited object of Werther’s fevered imagination of 
himself in relation to her than she is a being seen by him in her own right. She is 
an oecasion for him to fantasize himself complete, both original and at home. 
Lotte here plays the same role as was played by the earlier object of his affec­
tions, whom Werther describes wholly in terms of her effect on him:
I have felt that heart, that noble soul, in whose presence I seemed to be more than 
I really was, because I was all that I could be. God! Was there a single power in 
my soul that remained unused? And in her presence could I not develop fully that 
intense feeling with which my heart embraces Nature? (8)
Here, as ever, the real object of Werther’s consciousness is my soul, my heart, 
my seeming to be more than I really was. No wonder, then, that when he imag­
ines that she loves him, Werther rhapsodizes in the same egocentric terms: “That
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she loves me! How the idea exalts me in my own eyes! And [...] how I worship 
myself since she loves me!” (27)
Werther’s selfclaimed exceptionalism, his sense that unlike ordinary people 
“there lie dormant within me so many other qualities which wither unused, and 
which I must carefully conceal” (8), leads him consistently to scorn ordinary life 
and the achievements of reciprocity, decency, and human relationship that are 
possible in it. In particular, he scorns, while also envying, Albert’s staid conven­
tionalism and decency. But he here finds Albert only to be typical of what most 
people are like.
Most people”, he writes, “work the greater part of their time just for a living; and 
the little freedom which remains to them frightens them, so that they use every 
means of getting rid of it. Such is man’s high calling!(8)
In contrast, Werther seeks for himself a genuine high calling and exemplary, 
commanding achievement, outside the framework of the ordinaiy. Not for him 
“the gilded wretchedness, the boredom among the silly people who parade about 
in society here” (44) at court, a world in which he stands “before a puppet show 
and see[s] the little puppets move” (45), as they are “occupied with etiquette and 
ceremony” (45). Unable to mix with them, he argues that real love, constancy, 
and passion “exists in its greatest purity among that class of people whom we 
call rude, uneducated” (55), as he again hyperbolically idealizes a pastoralized 
ordinary life. Yet he is unable, with his dormant qualities which he must care­
fully conceal, to mix with ordinary people either.
Work, too, is treated by Werther as something either stalely conventional and 
meaningless or idealized as salvific. On the one hand,
the man who, purely for the sake of others, and without any passion or itmer 
compulsion of his own, toils after wealth or dignity, or any other phantom, is sim­
ply a fool. (28)
On the other hand.
Many a time I wish I were a common lalxtrer, so that when I awake in the morn­
ing I might at least have one clear prospect, one pursuit, one hope, for the day 
which has dawned. (37)
In both cases, his attention is on the work as the vehicle of the exalted expres­
sion of his personality, not on the work Itself and those who do it. Even when he 
imagines doing a small bit of work in first arriving at the court of Count C., his 
thoughts remain on himself and his superiority to others.
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But when, in spite of weakness and disappointments, we do our daily work in 
earnest, we shall find that with all false starts and compromises we make better 
headway than others who have wind and tide with them; and it gives one a real 
feeling of self to keep pace with others or outstrip them in the race. (42)
Werther’s God is similarly exceptional — a being whom he assumes either spe­
cifically listens to his pleas or specifically avoids them, without any mediating 
institutions or any involvements in the lives of others. On November 30'^ as he 
approaches his end, he addresses God directly and intimately, presuming to be 
his particular and special son.
Father, Whom I know not — Who were once wont to fill my soul, but Who now 
hidest Thy fece from me — call me back to Thee; be silent no longer! Thy si­
lence cannot sustain a soul which thirsts after Thee. What man, what father, 
could be angry with a son for returning to him unexpectedly, for embracing him 
and exclaiming.
Here I am again, my father! Forgive me if I have shortened my journey to return 
before the appointed time. The world is everywhere the same — for labor and 
pain, pleasure and reward, but what does it all avail? I am happy only where thou 
art, and in thy presence I tun content to suffer or enjoy. And Thou, Heavenly Fa­
ther, wouldst Thou turn such a child fi-om Thee? (64)
His address here is strikingly reminiscent of his earlier thoughts about Lotte, 
whom he similarly regards as his unique savior.
I eannot pray except to her. My imagination sees nothing but her; nothing matters 
except what has to do with her. (38)
What does it all avail? Seeking absolute and perfect ratification of his excep­
tional personality and talents, and perfect, autonomous selfhood joined to con­
tinuing sociality in a life of daily selfaffirming divinity, but finding only ordinary 
people and his own tortured thoughts and fantasies, Werther can in the end hit 
only on the strategy of giving it all up. The only fi’eedom fi'om continuing failure 
is death. “We desire to surrender our whole being” (20), and if partial, egocen­
tric surrender to Lotte, to art, to nature, or to work is received and ratified by no 
one, ordinary as they all are, then genuine surrender must be complete, an es­
cape fi'om life itself
I have heard of a noble race of horses that instinctively bite open a vein when they 
are hot and exhausted by a long run, in order to breathe more fi-eely. I am often 
tempted to open a vein, to gain everlasting liberty for myself. (50)
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As he recalls almost kissing Lotte,
And yet I want — but it stands like a barrier before my soul — this bliss — and 
then die to expiate the sin! Is it sin7’ (62) In the end; “The body was carried by 
workmen. No clergymen attended. (87)
Goethe himself, of course, did not commit suicide, despite the autobiographical 
character of the novel. Mann suggests that Goethe’s willingness to go living had 
to do with his sense of his identity as a writer.
Goethe did not kill himself’, Mann writes, “because he had Werther — and quite 
a few other things — to write. Werther has no other calling on this earth except 
his existential suffering, the tragic perspicacity for his imperfections, the Ham­
letlike loathing of knowledge that suffocates him: thus he must perish.’’
How did Goethe himself then come to have and to be aware of having another 
calling, one that made life for him worth living? As Mann suggests, the answer 
has to do, I think, with the very act of writing Werther, as well as with the on­
going activity of writing for a public already begun with Goetz von Berlichingen. 
For Goethe, the act of writing in general, and of writing Werther in particular, 
combined a kind of catharsis — both a clarification and an unburdening — of his 
emotional life with the achievement of a kind of distance or perspective on him­
self. He came through writing to achieve a sense of himself as having a social 
identity as a writer, so that the problem of wedding autonomous selfhood to 
continuing sociality did not for him go fully unsolved. It would be addressed 
again and again in the act of writing, from Faust to the lyric poetry to Elective 
Affinities, though with more maturity and never quite perhaps with the immedi­
ate cathartic intensity of address of Werther. Yet even in his maturity Goethe 
retained an intense subjectivity, capable of responding to others as though they 
were vehicles of salvation for him. Mann notes that at the age of 72 he fell in 
love with the 17 year old Ulrike Sophie von Levetzow. Though address and par­
tial solution to the problem of subjectivity are possible, perhaps full solution is 
not.
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s character strongly resembles those of Goethe and Wer­
ther. Both his personal and philosophical writings combine an intense wish for 
attachment to others or to activities as vehicles for the expression of the higher 
self he felt himself to have with an equally intense critical scrutiny of that wish. 
The subtitle of Ray Monk’s biography. The Duty of Genius, captures this feature 
of his character well. For the young Wittgenstein in particular, the realization 
and confirmation of genius was, in Monk’s words, “a Categorical Imperative”, 
and the only alternative to failing to follow it was death: genius or suicide.
17 Th. Mann, op. cit., 8.
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Wittgenstein’s recurring thoughts of suicide between 1903 and 1912, and the feet 
that these thoughts abated only after Russell’s recognition of his genius, suggest 
that he accepted this imperative in all its terrifying severity.'*
Monk traces Wittgenstein’s submission to this imperative to his reading of Otto 
Weininger’s Sex and Character, published in 1903, the year of Weininger’s own 
suicide. Brian McGuinness accepts this connection but goes further to read this 
imperative into the composition of the Tractatus and to situate it in the context 
of Wittgenstein’s family life and surrounding culture. McGuinness characterizes 
what he calls “the final message of the Tractatus” as
Perhaps a clearer, a more concentrated view [...] would enable him to see the 
world aright. At any rate, if there was no real prospect of this: if he could not 
reach this insight, and if he could not get rid of Ws troubles by reconciling himself 
to the world, then his life was pointless.”
What made this question — genius or suicide — arise with special force in 
Wittgenstein’s case, McGuinness argues, was not only the example and influ­
ence of Weininger or the general sickness of prewar Austrian culture, but also 
and more deeply the influence on him of his father. The Wittgenstein family
formed a sort of enclave, fortified against the corruption and inadequacy that sur­
rounded it by severe and private moral standards, which, it seemed, some of them 
had not the temperament to match or meet. Ludwig’s case ...seems to have that 
of a phenomenally strong assent and attachment to these standards, often at war 
not only with the normal human failings that became glaring in their light, but also 
with a particularly soft and affectionate nature. “
Yet McGuinness immediately goes on to add that Wittgenstein himself
was not one to see his problem as that of being unable to do what his father re­
quired,” and he further comments that “what we describing here is no disease.
As Tolstoy says: ‘These questions are the simplest in the world. From the stupid 
child to the wisest old man, they are in the soul of every human being.
With the example of Werther before us, we can see the problem of genius or 
suicide as forming a strong theme in German culture in its response to the yet 
more general problem of wedding autonomous selfliood to continuing sociality.
'* R. Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, New York: The Free Press, 1990 
25.
” B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life: Young Ludwig 1889-1921, Berkeley: The Univer­
sity of California Press, 1988, 156.
Ibid., 50.
Ibid.
Ibid., 156, citing Leo Tolstoy, A Confession.22
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Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with autonomy and with the realization and con­
firmation of genius against the grain of culture is pronounced in the remarks in 
his own voice published as Vermischte Bemerkungen, Culture and Value. “It’s a 
good thing”, he writes, “I don’t allow myself to be influenced.”^^ As is typical in 
the postKantian, postGoethean German tradition, the realization of genius is 
conceived of as a matter of letting something natural and divine come to the fore 
in one’s thought and life, often under the prompting of nature itself “Just let 
nature speak and acknowledge only one thing as higher than nature, but not what 
others may think.” (le) “Don’t t^e the example of others as your guide, but 
nature!” (41e)
When one is thus guided, one’s thinking and acting happen with significance, in 
and through one, rather than under one’s personal control. “One might say; art 
shows us the miracles of nature. It is based on the concept of the miracles of 
nature. (The blossom, just opening out. What is marvellous about it?) We say: 
“Just look at it opening out!“ (56e). It is just this kind of natural yet significant 
opening out of his own features of character that Wittgenstein anxiously hoped 
might inform his own thinking and writing.
Schiller writes of a ‘poetic mood’. I think I know what he means, I believe I am 
familiar with it myself It is a mood of receptivity to nature in which one’s 
thought seem as vivid as nature itself [...]I am not entirely convinced that what I 
produce in such a mood is really worth anything. It may be that what gives my 
thoughts their lustre on these occasions is a light shining on them fi"om behind. 
That they do not themselves glow. (65e-66e)
Something hidden, powerful, and natural within oneself is to come to the fore, in 
a way that is not under one’s egocentric control. One is to be swept along by 
one’s genius into a naturalsupematural movement of thinking.
Yet talent can also be betrayed or misused, and so fail to confirm Itself in its 
products. “Talent is a spring from which fresh water is constantly flowing. But 
this spring loses its value if it is not used in the right way.” (lOe) As a result, the 
most important thing is to come to think and write naturally, in faithfulness to 
one’s talent and against the grain of culture. But effort to do so takes space 
within the conventionalized space of personally controlled and discursive reflec­
tion, so that it is crossed by an anxious selfscrutiny. “Am I thinking and writing 
as it were beyond myself, out of the depths of the natural?”, one egocentrically 
and discursively wonders, or Wittgenstein wonders, in just the sort of tragic per­
spicacity about his own imperfections that Mann saw in Werther.
23 L. Wittgenstein, CV, le. Subsequent references to this work will be given by page num­
bers in parentheses.
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Working in philosophy [...] is really more a working on oneself. On one’s own 
interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)
(16e)
No one can speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself He cannot speak 
it; — but not because he is not clever enough yet.
The truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by 
someone who still lives in &lsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards 
truth on just one occasion. (35e)
All or nothing; naturalsupematural, nonconventionalized, poetic truth and ex­
pressiveness or imitative, derivative, nonexistence; genius or suicide.
Domination by this imperative produces the same complex of attitudes toward 
work and toward religion that we find in Werther. On the one hand, Wittgenstein 
idealizes ordinary manual work as something beautiful and honest, more honest 
than intellectual chatter: “what is ordinary is here filled with significance” 
(52e),^* if the manual work is done with respect and integrity. It is no accident, 
but rather deeply part of his anxious selfscrutiny and his attitudes toward culture 
and value, that Wittgenstein so often urged others to take up this kind of work. 
On the other hand, “Genius is what makes us forget skill” (43e). It is beyond the 
ordinary. So how can one express genius within the framework of the ordinary? 
How can one write poetically — originally and yet in a way that draws on the 
common and is accessible to others? How can one wed autonomous selfhood to 
continuing sociality?
I think I summed up my attitude toward philosophy when I said: philosophy 
ought really to be written only as a poetic composition. [...]! was thereby reveal­
ing myself as someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do.
(24e)
Religious faithfulness offers a paradigm of significant expressiveness, but a 
paradigm that in its traditional, institutionalized form is dead for us, shot through 
with the conventionality that expressiveness is to overcome. “What is good is 
also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something super­
natural can express the Supernatural.” (3e) What is needed is “a light fi-om 
above” that comes to the individual soul, not religious institutions and ordinary 
religious training.
Is what I am doing really worth the effort? Yes, but only if a light shines on it 
from above. [...] And if the light from above is lacking, I can’t in any case be 
more than clever. (57e-58e)
24 This remark is about “an ordinary conventional figure” at the end of Schubert’s Death 
and the Maiden, but it captures well Wittgenstein’s attitude toward the manual work he 
repeatedly urged on others.
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Religious belief cannot be something that is simply given and shared. It must 
rather be achieved through the dormant qualities of one’s soul coming actively to 
take religious life as the vehicle of their expression, as the terms of deep signifi­
cance.
It strikes me that a religious belief could only be something like a passionate 
commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a 
way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this in­
terpretation. (64e)
Above all, what Wittgenstein wants from religion, from work, from the guidance 
of nature, fi"om his genius, but can never quite find, is full looded and continuing 
significance in the face of mere conventionality and cleverness: a new life. “A 
confession has to be part of your new life.” (183) And if not a new life, then 
death: genius or suicide, or suicide as the creative act of voluntarily removing 
oneself fi-om a cycle of unending selfdefeat. In 1946, in the middle of remarks 
about music, thought, Shakespeare, God, heroism, and the difficulty of philoso­
phy, there occurs in Culture and Value, in quotation marks, the very last words 
of Werther to his correspondent Wilhelm: “Lebt wohl!”^^
Ifie intensities of Wittgenstein’s character have been well documented in the 
biographical literature. Yet one might argue that these intensities have little to do 
with his actual philosophical thinking and writing, or at least with what he chose 
to have published. After all, he also wrote in Culture and Value: “My ideal is a 
certain coolness. A temple providing a setting for the passions without meddling 
with them.” (2e) Yet it would be striking were his official philosophical writing 
to be wholly uninformed by the otherwise deepest preoccupations of his charac­
ter. Even in this remark, he presents a certain coolness as an ideal, not as 
something that he has actually achieved, and he did note that he was “someone 
who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do.” (24e) Is Philosophi­
cal Investigations in any sense about the problem of the realization of talent 
against the grain of but always in relation to the affordances of culture and the 
ordinary, about the problem of wedding autonomous selfliood to continuing so­
ciality? That Philosophical Investigations is about this, in detail, line by line, as 
well as being about the nature of meaning, understanding, the will, and so on, 
and about this by being about these latter topics, is a main line of argument of 
my Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism. I
J. W. V. Goethe, Die Leiden desjungen Werther, Stuttgart; Reclam, 1948, 147. Werther 
actually adds one more line to Wilhelm: “wir sehen uns wieder und freudiger”, ibid., 147. 
But Lebt wohl!” alone is what lives in the memory of his readers as his valedictory to 
life, particularly since his last diary entry, addressed to Lotte, concludes “Es schlagt 
zwdlfe. So sei es denn! —Lotte! Lotte, lebe wohl! lebe wohl!”, ibid., 150.
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cannot recapitulate the whole of that argument here. But I will offer a few brief 
pointers to it.
In Section 125 of Philosophical Investigations, we find that “das philosophische 
Problem [...] ist [...] die biirgerliche Stellung des Widerspruchs, oder seine Stel- 
lung in der biirgerlichen Welt”; in English, and appropriately, that “the philo­
sophical problem [...] is [...] the civil status of a contradiction, or its status in 
civil life.”^* “Our entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand” 
(§125). This entanglement “throws light on our concept of meaning something” 
(§125). — What is it to be entangled in rules in civil life, in ordinary life, in the 
ordinary, civil “biirgerlichen” world? Not to “know one’s way about” (§123) is 
not to know how to engage with this world, how to bring one’s talents and self­
hood to authentic, nonderivative, and yet ratifiable expression within it. To ask 
“what does this knowledge [of how to go on in applying a rule] consist in?” 
(§148) is to ask what there is in me — what talent, what locus of understanding, 
what source of mastery — that enables me to go on and how to bring this talent, 
locus, or source to apt expression. Something must be there in me. I can do 
something, and we are not in using language aptly either machines or other ani­
mals. But what is it? And do I bring whatever it is to expression aptly? How? I 
seem caught between an anxiety that the only routes of expression are those al­
ready laid down in surrounding practice, that I contribute nothing, that I am or­
dinary, and hence nonexistent: call this the anxiety of expressibility; and an anxi­
ety that I cannot express that whateveritis in the ordinary, that I am alone, and 
mad: call this the anxiety of inexpressibility. To be able to mean something, to 
understand something: these are the results of the mysterious engagement of 
spontaneity in me, the source of originality, with the routes of expression that are 
given in practice, as though a seed in me — but one I can never identify or culti­
vate deliberately — grew in relation to its environment.
Each morning you have to break through the dead rubble afresh so as to reach the 
living warm seed. A new word is like a fresh seed sewn on the ground of the dis­
cussion. (2e)
It may well be that there is for the language user “a special experience” of un­
derstanding, but this special experience cannot be grasped and deliberately de­
ployed independently of engagement with the affordances of culture. “For us it is 
the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in 
saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on.” (§ 155) 
The always mysterious interaction of circumstances, that is, of the affordances of 
culture in providing routes of expression, with the powers of selfhood is some-
L. Wittgenstein, PI §§ 125, 50, 50e. Subsequent references to this work wiU be given in 
the text by section number.
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thing to be accepted, not explained in either a scientific or intellectualistic the­
ory.
Wittgenstein too, like Goethe but unlike Werther, did not commit suicide. His 
last words, famously, were “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life”.^’ Like Goethe, 
he achieved through the act of writing, repeatedly and day to day, a kind of ca­
tharsis, some distance or perspective on his anxieties as a subject, and a sense of 
himself as having a social identity as a writer. Hence there is some point to 
thinking that the second voice of the Investigations (if there are only two) — the 
voice that rebukes the tendency to seek scientific or intellectualist explanations 
of our cognitive abilities and that recalls us instead to the ways of the ordinary 
— is Wittgenstein’s more mature voice. At the same time, however, the first 
voice — the voice of temptation and of intensities of perfect explanation and at- 
tunement — is his too, a voice he cannot quite give up, much as Goethe in his 
maturity would not give up intensities of infatuation and would still also identify 
himself with such intensities in Edward in Elective Affinities. The mature voice 
of the ordinary, the voice of survival, comes to the fore and is allowed the last 
word within a section, but always in continuing critical engagement with the 
voice of perfectly grounded and explained attunement, the voice of temptation.
Wittgenstein knew all this about himself. In 1931, in one of the remarks of Cul­
ture and Value, he wrote: “The delight I take in my thoughts is delight in my 
own strange life. Is this joy of living?” (22e) It is perhaps the kind of joy in liv­
ing, arising out of the acknowledgement of the weddedness of one’s selfliood to 
others and to the given and out of gratitude for that weddedness and the always 
partial expressiveness it enables, that is open to us as subjects who seek to 
achieve both autonomous selfhood and continuing sociality.
27 L. Wittgenstein, cited in N. Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1958, 100.
